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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce DFSSD, a novel logic
locking solution for sequential and FSM circuits with a re-
stricted (locked) access to the scan chain. DFSSD combines two
techniques for obfuscation: (1) Deep Faults, and (2) Shallow
State Duality. Both techniques are specifically designed to
resist against sequential SAT attacks based on bounded model
checking. The shallow state duality prevents a sequential SAT
attack from taking a shortcut for early termination without
running an exhaustive unbounded model checker to assess if
the attack could be terminated. The deep fault, on the other
hand, provides a designer with a technique for building deep, yet
key recoverable faults that could not be discovered by sequential
SAT (and bounded model checker based) attacks in a reasonable
time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To reduce the cost of semiconductor fabrication and shorten
the time to market of integrated circuits (IC), most of the
fabrication processes are pushed offshore [1]. This glob-
alization of supply chain has tremendously raised security
concerns such as the possibility of third-party intellectual
property (3PIP) theft, IC overproduction, Trojan insertion, and
adversarial reverse engineering. To overcome such threats,
various active and passive design-for-trust mechanisms have
been proposed in the literature, among which logic locking,
a.k.a. hardware obfuscation, has been manifested as proac-
tive protection against all these threats [2, 3]. The validity
and strength of the state-of-the-art logic locking solutions
to protect IPs/ICs against adversaries in the manufacturing
supply chain was seriously challenged in recent years after the
introduction of the Boolean satisfiability attack (SAT Attack)
[4–6]. After introduction of the SAT attacks, researchers
investigated a body of locking solutions with the objective
of resisting the SAT attack [7–12]. However, further research
revealed that increasing resistance against SAT attack makes
such solutions vulnerable against alternative (and even sim-
pler) attack solutions such as Signal Probability Skew (SPS)
and structural analysis-based attacks [13–15].
The original SAT attack was only applicable to combi-
national circuits. However, the existence of the scan chain,
allows an adversary to treat the FSM and sequential circuits
as a combinational circuit; using the scan chain, the attacker
to load desired input into scan registers, carry the attack for
one cycle, and readout the output through the scan chain [4].
Hence, to prevent the SAT attack on obfuscated sequential
and FSM solutions, various means for restricting access to the
scan chain [16, 17] was investigated. In this approach, which
is illustrated in Fig. 1, an obfuscation solution is constructed
using two key values: (1) a key for obfuscating the functional
logic, and (2) a key for obfuscating the scan chain.
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Fig. 1. An obfuscated IC with restricted access to scan chain.
Restricting access to (or locking of) the scan chain, how-
ever, did not stop the researchers from developing variants
of SAT attack solution capable of attacking an obfuscated
circuit. Lack of access to the scan chain was addressed
in [18] by changing the attack model to find a sequence of
inputs (rather than a single input) resulting in incorrect output.
This attack, so-called unrolling-based SAT (UB-SAT) attack,
expands the given FSM in time to be able to find a sequence
of distinguishing inputs.
To defend against UB-SAT and model checker based at-
tacks in design with restricted access to the scan chain, in
this paper, we introduce a new obfuscation solution denoted
as Deep Faults and Shallow State Duality (DFSSD). The
DSFFD obfuscation scheme exploits the weaknesses of the
existing attacks in obfuscating FSM and sequential circuits
and prevents these attacks from satisfying their early exit
conditions, forcing them to become unbounded. To build
the DFSSD solution, we propose a combination of two
concepts: (1) encrypting Deep Faults (DF), the discovery of
which requires specific traversal patterns with a large enough
depth that cannot be reached by bounded model checkers
or unrolling based SAT attacks. (2) encoding Shallow State
Duality (SSD), in which by implementing key-controlled
duplicate states, the early termination conditions of the UB-
SAT are violated.
II. PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND
As described earlier, limiting access to the scan chain
removes the ability of the attacker to deploy a pure SAT attack
on the combinational logic between internal scan registers,
and has to revert to the weaker variant of SAT attacks such
as UB-SAT (working with only primary input and primary
output). Following is a short background on Scan chain
obfuscation and proposed attack solutions for de-obfuscating
such solutions needed for understanding the DFSSD.
Securing Scan Chain Structure: Several methods have
been recently proposed in the literature to obfuscate the scan
chains [19, 20]. To secure the test and debug operations,
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Algorithm 1 Sequential Attack on Obfuscated Circuits
1: b = initial boundary, Terminated = False;
2: Model = C(X,K1, Y1) ∧ C(X,K2, Y2) ∧ (Y1 6= Y2);
3: while not Terminated do
4: while (XDIS , K1, K2)← BMC(Model, b) = T do
5: Yf ← CBlackBox(XDI);
6: Model = ∧ C(XDIS , K1, Yf ) ∧ C(XDIS , K2, Yf );
7: if UC(Model, b) ∨ CE(Model, b) ∨ UMC(Model) then
8: Terminated;
9: b = b+ boundary step;
[16] proposed a design-for-security (DFS) flow that deploys
a structure, denoted as Secure Cell (SC). However, SC was
compromised via the shift-and-leak attack [17]. Another early
attempt in this domain was the Encrypt Flip-Flop (EFF) [19]
scheme. In EFF the output of each scan flop is obfuscated
based on a key value such that either the Q or Qbar output
is propagated in the scan chain, and accordingly, the scan-
in sequence is also modified. The EFF was also tackled
by the ScanSAT attack [21]. The Dynamically Obfuscated
Scan (DOS) [20] scheme obfuscates the scan chain while
periodically changing the obfuscation key during the test
process. Assuming a hard to break scan chain obfuscation,
the pure SAT attack could be no longer applied. Hence, an
attacker should resort to SAT attack variants designed for
attacking scan-access restricted obfuscation solutions by only
relying on controllability (observability) of primary inputs
(outputs).
Deobfuscation Methods Without Scan Chain Access:
El Massad et al. [18] extended the SAT attack to circuits
with no scan chain access, proposing an attack that only
required access to the primary input/outputs of an activated
chip. The attack procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. Similar
to the SAT attack, it has an iterative process for pruning the
search space. However, due to the restricted access to the
internal registers, rather than finding a Discriminating Input
(in each iteration), it finds a sequence of inputs X denoted as
Discriminating Input Sequence (XDIS) that can generate two
different outputs for the same input sequence for two different
keys. In this algorithm, C(X,K, Y ) refers to the obfuscated
circuit producing output sequence Y using input sequence X
and key vector K, and CBlackBox(X) refers to the output
sequence of the activated circuit for the same input sequence.
After transforming the obfuscated circuit to a circuit SAT
(Model) problem, the attack instantiates a Bounded Model
Checker (BMC) to find the XDIS . After the discovery of
each XDIS , the Model is updated with a new condition to
make sure that the next onset of keys, that will be discovered
in the subsequent attack iterations, produce the same output
for previously discovered XDIS . This process continues until
no further XDIS is found within the boundary of b.
After reaching the boundary, the algorithm checks three
criteria to determine if the attack can be terminated: (1)
Unique Completion (UC): This criterion checks for the
uniqueness of the key. If there is only a single key that
satisfying all previous DISes, the attack is terminated. (2)
Combinational Equivalence (CE): If there is more than
one key that agrees with all previously found XDIS , the
attack checks the combinational equivalency of the remaining
keys. In this step, the input/output of FFs are considered
as pseudo primary outputs/inputs allowing the attacker to
treat the circuit as combinational. The resulting circuit is
subjected to a SAT attack, and if the SAT solver fails to
find a different output or next state for two different keys,
it concludes that all remaining keys are correct and the attack
terminates. (3) Unbounded Model Check (UMC): If UC
and CE fail, the attack checks the existence of a DIS for the
remaining keys using an unbounded model checker. This is an
exhaustive search with no limitation on bound (or the number
of unrolls). If no DIS is discovered, the existing set of DIS is a
complete set, and the attack terminates. Otherwise, the bound
is increased and previous steps are repeated. The original
implementation of this attack [18] uses NuSMV as the model
checker and is not scalable for larger circuits. Shamsi et al.
improved this attack via implementing several tweaks in the
attack procedure [22].
III. PROPOSED METHODS
The practicality of UB-SAT attack (proposed in [18])
is grounded on the use of a fast bounded model checker
(BMC) [23] and the implementation of early termination
strategies to avoid the exhaustive search. This allows the
attacker to avoid using time-consuming and exhaustive un-
bounded model checking runs for the discovery of DISes
and to find the obfuscation key in a reasonable time. In this
section, we describe an obfuscation solution that 1) prevent
the UC and CE early termination, and 2) pushes the required
bound for a BMC solver to an unreasonably large bound
(which is defined at design time), resulting in unreasonable
attack time against the proposed obfuscation solution.
A. Shallow State Duality
The first termination criterion (UC) relies on the uniqueness
of the key and it fails if there is more than one valid key
for the obfuscated circuit. In the sequential attack proposed
in [18], UC was the main termination criterion for most of
the benchmarks. For the second termination criteria (CE),
successful termination relies on the equality of all next state
and output values for remaining candidate keys for all input
and state combinations.
Our proposed solution for breaking both UC and CE
termination checks is simply adding duplicate key controlled,
yet valid states such that more than one valid key exists. We
refer to this scheme as Shallow State Duality (SSD). This
concept is illustrated in Fig. 2. In this example, the original
FSM has five Reachable States (RS) and three Un-Reachable
States (URS). In the modified FSM, the unreachable states
are used to replicate three of the existing states such that the
transition to the original or replicated state is controlled by
a key. In this example, all the replicated states produce the
same outputs as the original state and key bits are correct for
both values of 0 and 1, although, it might not be the case
in a different implementation. Therefore, the UC check fails
as more than one correct key exists. In addition, in the CE
check, the input to the registers is considered as a primary
output. Hence, for duplicated states, two different key values
do not generate the same output as they do not reach the
same state. Note that the SSD is not a form of obfuscation as
multiple keys are correct keys and it should be combined with
our obfuscation solution which is described next. However, it
is an effective and low-overhead technique to prevent early
termination of the UB-SAT attack and its variants.
The duplicate states can be added during the state encoding
(design time) or after logic synthesis (physical design time).
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Fig. 2. (a) Original state transition graph, (b) Modified state transition graph
with duplicate states (shallow state duality).
Algorithm 2 Extracting an unreachable state with minimum ham-
ming distance from a reachable state
1: boundary = limit, i = 1, hd = 1
2: Model = Ccomb(X,S,O, Snext) ∧ Ccomb(X1, Sinit, O1, S1)
3: while true do
4: A = (∀(S,X), ∃Surs, Snext 6= Surs) ∧ (HD(Surs, Si) == hd)
5: if (Si−1, Si, Surs)← QBF (Model ∧ A) = T then
6: return Si−1, Si, Surs
7: else if i < boundary then
8: i = i+ 1
9: Model = ∧ Ccomb(Xi, Si−1, Oi, Si)
10: else if i == boundary and hd < output width then
11: i = 1, hd = hd+ 1
Fig. 2 shows an example of a state transition graph encoded
with duplicated states at design time. The circuit functionality
remains unchanged while the circuit has 24 = 16 correct keys.
For adding duplicate states to a synthesize netlist, we first
need to find a few unreachable states (Surs). The Algorithm
2 describes our approach for finding such states using a
quantified Boolean formula (QBF) solver. To minimize the
logic (overhead) needed for encoding the duplicate states, we
search for Surs with minimum hamming distance (HD) from
one of reachable (existing) states. In this Algorithm, inputs,
states, outputs, and next states are defined as X , S, O, and
Snext, respectively, and Ccomb refers to the combinational
representation of the original circuit in which the input/output
of FFs are considered as pseudo primary outputs/inputs (sim-
ilar to CE check in UB-SAT attack).
After initializing the boundary limit and defining the de-
sired hamming distance (e.g. hd=1), a model consisting of two
Ccomb instances is created. To find a Surs, one instance of
Ccomb is used as Ccomb(X,S,O, Snext) with for-all condition
on its primary inputs (X) and current states (S) to generate all
the outputs (O) and next states (Snext) that could be produced
by the Ccomb. By assuming Snext 6= Surs, the QBF solver
will attempt to find a set of values for Surs that is not a
part of the generated Snext. Then, to select a URS from
the set of Surs that has a hamming distance of hd from a
RS, another instance of Ccomb as Ccomb(X1, Sinit, O1, S1)
is used. In the QBF solver, this instance produces RSes (S1)
that are reachable from the initial state (Sinit). Any URS in
Surs with HD of one from the S1 could be considered as the
answer. If such a URS was not found, a new copy of Ccomb
as Ccomb(X2, S1, O2, S2) is added to the model to produce
RSes that are reachable from the initial state in two cycles. If
necessary, this unrolling continues until the boundary limit to
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Fig. 3. Implementation of Deep Fault (DF) obfuscation for a 011 detector.
The protected pattern include the counter (C1C0) FFs, and the (S1S0) state
FFs. The state transition graph of the circuit is shown in the middle right.
check Surs with all RSes reachable in i cycles. When a URS
is found, it is added to the netlist by adding the logic to make
the transition between the URS and the original states based
on the key value. The URS will produce the same output as
the original RS it was duplicated from and will transition to
the same next state(s) (or the duplicate of the next states).
B. Deep Faults
The sequential attack [18] relies on a bounded search
space for finding a discriminating input sequence XDIS , and
it keeps increasing the boundary if the termination checks
fail. The XDIS is a sequence of inputs, each forces a
transition to a new state until a discriminating state is reached,
where a discriminating state refers to a state whose output
is different for the same input with two different keys (a
DIP condition). This state traversal (based on XDIS) will not
include any other discriminating state transition or repeated
state. Such a discriminating state could only be found if
the shortest state traversal path from the initial state to that
state is shallower than the boundary condition (the number
of transitions) specified when invoking the BMC solver.
The traversal depth of a sequential/FSM circuit is defined as
the maximum number of state traversals (starting from initial
state) where no state is visited twice. However, the sequen-
tial/FSM circuits may have a limited traversal depth [24]. This
makes a BMC a plausible attack for finding all possible DIS
in such circuits, as all states can be visited within a reasonably
small bound. Our solution to protect against BMC formulated
attack (e.g., [18]) is to increase the traversal depth of the
FSM/sequential circuits and push the impact of wrong keys
into deep states beyond reach of the BMC (with reasonable
bound). This makes the discovery of such DIS unreasonably
time consuming. We refer to such faults as deep faults.
Our obfuscation methodology for creating Deep Faults
(DF) is described via the example shown in Fig. 3. The circuit
targeted for obfuscation is a simple ‘0-1-1’ input sequence
detector. As illustrated, the DF is implemented by adding 1) a
tracer circuit, 2) a flip circuit, and 3) a recovery circuit to the
original circuit. The tracer, as described earlier, is a function-
modified counter or a LSFR that changes its state each time
a triggering event is observed. The triggering events can be
selected state transitions, state visits, or simply the rising
edge of the clock. For simplicity, in Fig. 4, the triggering
event is the clock and the tracer is a 2-bit counter. The
flip circuit toggles the value of a single primary output of
the original circuit when a protected pattern is observed.
The protected pattern is a predefined pattern generated by
combining selected state registers (from the original design)
TABLE I
TRUTH TABLE FOR THE 011 DETECTOR OBFUSCATED USING A TWO-BIT
COUNTER. S1S2 AND C1C2 DENOTE THE STATE AND COUNTER FFS
RESPECTIVELY. Y IS THE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT OUTPUT AND Kn IS THE
OUTPUT FOR EACH FOUR-BIT KEY. THE PROTECTED PATTERN AND KEY
ARE 1011. STATE VALUES OF 11XX ARE UNREACHABLE.
S1S2C1C2 Y K0 K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K11 K12 K13 K14 K15
0000 X 7 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
0001 X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
0010 X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
0011 X X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X X X
0100 X X X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X X
0101 X X X X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X
0110 X X X X X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X
0111 X X X X X X X X 7 X X X X X X X X
1000 X X X X X X X X X 7 X X X X X X X
1001 X X X X X X X X X X 7 X X X X X X
1010 X X X X X X X X X X X 7 X X X X X
1011 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
11xx S=11 is unreachable
and tracer’s state register. In Fig. 3, the flip circuit is shown as
a four-input AND gate that fires when the protected ’10,11’
pattern for ’S1S0, C1C0’ is observed. The last component
of the Deep Fault obfuscation is the recovery circuit that
toggles the output signal when the inserted obfuscation key
agrees with the protected pattern. Hence, when the correct key
is applied (1011 in this case), the previously flipped output
related to the protected pattern will flip back (recovered) by
the recovery circuit, however, insertion of a wrong key will
result in flipping a correct output.
Table I shows the truth table of the circuit in Fig. 3
for all key-combinations. In this circuit, when the DF is
subjected to UB-SAT attack, each input can only rule out
a single wrong key. Thereby, the pruning power of each
discovered DIS is very limited, and the correct key is found
only when the protected input is tested. This concept is similar
to obfuscation solutions using point functions (e.g. SARLock
[25] and Anti-SAT [26]). However, there is a fundamental
difference. In point functions, the adversary uses a random
input, and although the average case or worse case attack
time is an exponential function of the key size, the attacker
can potentially discover the correct key with a single lucky
attempt. However, in deep faults, the discovery of DISes
is conditioned on the tracer state, which cannot be directly
controlled by input. Hence, it can guarantee a minimum bound
on the number of required DISes before the discovery of
the fault, which is at least equal to the number of cycles
needed for the tracer to reach the fault generation state. This
is a necessary condition for the generation of the fault, but
it is not enough. For the fault to occur, the selection of state
registers of the circuit that are included as a part of a protected
pattern should also reach the fault generating pattern. Hence,
the number of required DISes, which is equal to the number
of cycles to reach the protected pattern, can be far larger.
The lower bound for finding the protected pattern could be
defined based on the tracer event counting mechanism. For
simplicity, let’s assume a counter is used as the tracer circuit.
Lemma 1. The bound requirement for a BMC solver to find
the protected pattern of a deep fault which is implemented
using a simple clocked counter is C = 2w where w is width
of the counter.
Proof. The protected pattern consists of two parts: 1) w bits
of tracer (counter) register bits, and s bits of state registers.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, the portion of protected pattern
implemented by counter is reached every C = 2w cycles.
However, the state transition does not have a predefined
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Fig. 5. Deep faults mechanism for transition-triggered counter.
traversal order, and the fault is only generated when the
protected pattern (state-tracer) is observed. If the s bits of
state registers, that are selected for inclusion in the protected
pattern, do not take the needed value to build the protected
pattern at cycle C, the fault is not generated. The next viable
cycle for reaching the protected pattern will be at 2×C or in
general at N × C. Hence, the minimum bound requirement
for a BMC attack to discover the fault is C = 2w. 
Lemma 2. The bound requirement for a BMC solver to find
the protected pattern for a deep fault which is implemented
using a tracer that counts a selected state transition is M +
C×L+Q, where M is the shortest path to reach the selected
state transition from the initial state, C = 2w, w is width of
the counter, L is the shortest sequence of state transitions to
visit the selected triggering transition twice (shortest cycle
including the triggering transition), and Q is the number of
state transitions to reach a state whose encoding completes
the protected pattern signature.
Proof. As shown in Fig. 5, the tracer only counts up if a
specified state transition occurs. It takes at least M cycles for
the first triggering event to occur. After this transition, the
shortest sequence of transition that could result in a count-
up is L, where the state transition is repeated. The number
of times the triggering state transition should be visited is
C = 2w times. After M + (C ×L) cycles, the tracer portion
of the protected pattern is ready for fault generation. However,
we still need another Q cycles to reach a state whose encoding
completes the protected pattern. If the target state could not
be met in M + (C × L) +Q cycles, it might need to repeat
(C ∗ L) for N times to be able to reach the target state. So
the number needed cycles for generating the deep fault is
M + N(C × L) + Q. The lower bound of required cycles
(equal to the number of DIS) occurs at N = 1, thus the
minimum required BMC bound for the discovery of fault is
M + (C × L) +Q. 
Fig. 6 shows the result of the UB-SAT attack on the 011 de-
tector of Fig. 3. With a 2-bit counter, according to Lemma 1,
the BMC min-bound of discovering faults is 22 = 4. As
01
01
01
01
10
10
00
10
01
10
01
10
00
11
01
11
00
11
01
11
10
11
1/1
1/0
0/1
0/0
1/1
1/0 DIS (len = 4) × 1
DIS (len = 3) × 2
01
01
00
00
01
01
00
01
00
00
0/1
0/0
0/1
0/0
DIS (len = 1) × 1
DIS (len = 2) × 1
S1S0
C1C0
Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4
00
00
00
01
00
00
00
00
00
01
00
10
10
10
Fig. 6. Cycle by cycle DIS discovery for the 011 detector of Fig. 3, which is
obfuscated using DF with a 2-bit counter. The deep fault is discovered when
the deep state representing the protected state (shown in green) is reached.
expected, in each cycle at least one fault is discovered, while
the deep fault is discovered at the expected boundary of 4.
C. Preventing the Removal of the Tracer
A simple mechanism to implement the DF-tracer is using
a counter. However, counters can be easily identified by
structural analysis [27] as they have well-defined structure
and are loosely connected to the rest of the circuit. Note
that, for implementing the DF, the exact counter behavior is
not needed; We only need a tracer circuit for tracking cycles
or events. Hence, we can use an event tracking LFSR (i.e.
where LFSR state is updated based on a state transition)
or a function-modified (with different encoding) counter to
implement the tracer. The repetition period of LFSR (number
of non-repeated LSFR state values) would serve as the depth
that the fault could be delayed. In addition, to prevent the
attacker from structural analysis using asynchronous signals,
the enable/rest signal of the tracer circuit should not be
separated from the rest of the circuit. furthermore, the tracer
could be designed to exhibit a pseudo-counter behaviour such
that the update of the tracer’s different register state values
relies on both the existing tracer register values and other
registers selected from the sequential circuit or FSM.
With the changes discussed earlier, the inserted tracer
(modified-counter or LFSR) can not be functionally identified.
However, it is still prone to detection by structural analysis
of the data flow graph. As Fig. 7.(a) shows, the tracer is
still loosely connected to the rest of circuit. To resolve this
issue, the data flow graph of the obfuscated circuit should be
modified such that tracer circuit can not be easily isolated. In
other words, the tracer’s registers’ values should be also in
the input logic cone of the other FFs. However, this should
not affect the functionality of the tracer. One solution for
modifying the data flow graph, as illustrated in Fig. 7.(b)
is through the usage of Covert Gates [28]. These gates
have dummy inputs, connected to always on or always off
transistors, that don’t affect the gates’ function. In practice,
the gates in the logic cone of the state registers can be
replaced by Covert gates, and the tracer registers’ output can
be connected to the dummy inputs of the covert gates. With
this change, without modifying the circuit functionality, the
tracer circuit will be strongly connected to the rest of the
circuit when the data flow graph is extracted. The covert gates
can be also used to bring additional dummy inputs from the
state machine or sequential circuit to tracer without affecting
its functionality. The problem with this method is that it can
only protect the design against adversaries attempting to fully
reverse engineer an existing ASIC, and it does not protect
the IP against an untrusted manufacturing facility. In fact, the
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Fig. 7. Camouflaged (Covert) gates and non-occurring states could be used
for merging the two strongly-connected graphs of state and counter FFs.
a) DF circuit, b) DF circuit hidden by covert gates, c) DF circuit hidden by
building dummy logic from non-occurring signal combinations, d) a covert
gate implementation with dummy input, e) non-occurring signal used for
implementing dummy logic.
manufacturing facility has access to the layout represented via
the GDSII file. Hence, the Covert gates are not hidden from
the foundry.
To protect against adversarial reverse engineering at un-
trusted foundries, one can also utilize non-occurring signal
combinations in the netlist for building dummy connections
to/from the tracer circuit. As Fig. 7 shows, the non-occurring
signal combinations can be found using a QBF solver [9] and
utilized to design an always-zero (or one) signal combined
from counter FFs and signals in input cone of other state
FFs.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented the UB-SAT attack using Yices SMT
solver by creating the combinational equivalent circuit and
unrolling it for finding DISes and checking UC and CE
terminations. For UMC termination, we have used SuperProve
from Berkeley ABC package [30]. The experiments were
performed on an Intel Core i5 with 64GB RAM.
Table II captures the results of attacking the ISCAS’89
benchmarks when encoded using duplicated states (SSD),
obfuscated using deep faults (DF), protected using a combi-
nation of both techniques (DFSSD). The first few columns of
the table describe the characteristics of these benchmarks in
terms of number of flip-flops (FF), number of primary I/O (PI
and PO), and number of unreachable states (URS) according
to [29]. In this table DFw represent a DF obfuscation,
constructed using a counter of width w. For each obfuscated
circuit, number of discovered DISes, and the number of inputs
in the last DIS (its length) is reported as D/S. The maximum
attack time is set to eight hours. Attacks that take longer are
reported as TO.
The SSD column of Table II captures the result of UB-
SAT attack against circuits protected only by Shallow State
Duality. As expected, when UB-SAT is deployed against a
SSD encoded circuit, the UC And CE termination strategies
become useless. As reported, for all SSD-encoded bench-
marks, either the attack is terminated by UMC or prematurely
terminated for lack of memory resources.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR SHALLOW STATE DUALITY (SSD) AND DEEP FAULTS (DF) METHODS. ITERATION OF LAST DIS (D) AND ITS LENGTH (S)
IS REPORTED IN D/S COLUMNS. TIME IS IN SECONDS. SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION CONDITION IS REPORTED IN Term COLUMN.
Circuit
Circuit Info Shallow State Duality Deep Faults DFSSD
URS count from [29] SSD DF3 DF4 DF5 DF7 SSD + DF5 SSD + DF7
FF PI PO URS D/S Time Term D/S Time Term D/S Time Term D/S Time Term D/S Time Term D/S Time Term D/S Time Term
s344 15 9 11 9,536 0 9 UMC 29/8 39 UC 56/16 139 UC 119/32 2849 UC - TO - 115/32 5231 UMC - TO -
s382 21 3 6 2,073,412 0 5 UMC 17/48 9393 UMC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
s386 6 7 7 51 0 6 UMC 8/8 9 UC 29/16 45 UC 70/32 482 UC - TO - 65/32 1232 UMC - TO -
s526 21 3 6 1,695,692 0 5 UMC 27/16 463 UMC 49/32 1580 UMC 92/64 4684 UMC - TO - 90/64 4676 UMC - TO -
s713 19 35 23 517,625 0 223 UMC 15/8 28 UC 53/16 317 UC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
s832 5 18 19 7 0 12 UMC 32/16 86 UC 44/16 148 UC 99/32 2549 UC - TO - - TO - - TO -
s838 32 34 1 > 230 - TO - 20/72 1096 UC 43/80 2194 UC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
s1196 18 14 14 259,492 0 12 UMC 27/8 77 UC 64/16 377 UC 135/32 3146 UC - TO - - TO - - TO -
s1423 74 17 5 > 272 - TO - 8/8 26 UC 49/16 2924 UC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
s1494 6 8 19 16 0 15 UMC 21/8 46 UC 78/16 369 UC 187/32 4333 UC - TO - - TO - - TO -
s5378 179 35 49 > 2176 0 65 UMC 42/8 1653 UC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
s9234 211 36 39 > 2227 0 3065 UMC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
s38584 1426 38 304 > 21449 - TO - 8/8 1293 UC - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO - - TO -
Table II also captures the results of attacking circuits,
which are obfuscated using deep faults with varying counter
widths (3, 4, 5, and 7 bits). From this table, following
observations are made: 1) the number of discovered DISes
grow exponentially with respect to the size of the counter.
This is consistent with the Lemma 1: at each cycle we can
produce at least 1 DIS until the protected pattern (which in
this case is encoded using the highest value of the counter)
is reached. Hence, we should at least have 2w DISes. 2)
The size of the largest input sequence (S) in which the deep
fault is discovered is N × 2w (N being an integer). This is
consistent with Lemma 1, where the protected pattern could
be potentially (but not necessarily) observed at every N×2w
cycles; 3) the runtime of the attack increases exponentially
as the depth of DF tracer circuit (counter) increases; and 4)
when the circuit is solely protected by DF, the UC termination
is the most reoccurring termination strategy.
The last two columns of Table II, capture the impact of
combining the DF and SSD (DFSSD) which is the main
solution proposed in this paper. The DFSSD combines the
best feature of the two solutions. The SSD prevents early UC
and CE termination, while the DF pushes the faults down
into deep states, resulting in an exponential increase in the
number of required DISes and the attack time with respect
to the counter size. Note that by preventing the UC and CE
terminations, and by forcing the attack to UMC termination
check in every iteration, the SSD+DF5 has considerably larger
runtime compared to DF5.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed DFSSD, an obfuscation solution
for FSM and sequential circuits with restricted (locked) access
to the scan chain. The DFSSD deployed two mechanisms,
specifically designed to resist against BMC-based attacks
such as UB-SAT: 1) it uses shallow state duality to prevent
early termination of such attacks by invalidating the unique
completion and combinational equivalence checks, forcing the
attack to rely on exhaustive and time-consuming UMC for
assessing the attack’s termination condition; 2) it injects fault
into deep and hard to reach (by a BMC) states. The DFSSD
allows the designer to precisely control the depth of the fault
at design time using a low overhead circuit solution and make
the attack time unreasonably long.
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